We realize a time-bin qudit-based quantum key distribution system that uses two-photon interference for measuring the phase-basis states, allowing us to generate a secret key at a megabits-per-second rate.
High-dimensional quantum key distribution (QKD) protocols implemented with time-bin qudits (dimension d > 2) promise to overcome some of the practical challenges of qubit-based (d = 2) QKD systems, such as the long recovery time of single-photon counting detectors, or the low tolerance to errors arising from the noise in the quantum channel. Some of the recent studies of time-bin qudit-based QKD systems have demonstrated greater photon information efficiency (which scales as log 2 d), higher secret key generation capability compared to qubit-based protocols, and a high error tolerance, all of which are advantageous for practical QKD systems [1, 2] .
One challenge in time-bin QKD systems is measuring the phase states, which are mutually unbiased with respect to the temporal states. Past efforts require intricate detection schemes, such as a network of time-delay interferometers [4] , or fiber Bragg gratings (FBGs) [2] , or a combination of electro-optic phase modulators and FBGs, among others. While all these techniques are capable of measuring the phase states successfully, they have unique challenges. For instance, the efficiency of phase-state measurement using time-delay interferometers scales as 1/d, and matching the FBGs at the transmitter and receiver is also challenging. Here, we present a new method for measuring the MUB states that relies on the Hong-Ou-Mandel (HOM) interference of two indistinguishable photons [3] . Additionally, we show theoretically that the protocol can be secured against collective attack by using just one phase state, which greatly simplifies experimental setup.
Our experimental setup is illustrated in Fig. 1(a) . In this protocol, Alice prepares qudit states in the time-bin basis, |t n n ∈ 0,...,d − 1 to encode the information, or in a mutually unbiased phase basis state
i=0 |t i to monitor the presence of an eavesdropper. The state | f 0 is the superposition of the time-basis states with a relative phase of zero between the wavepacket peaks, as illustrated in the lower panel of Fig. 1(b) for d = 4. Alice and Bob each prepare these states by modulating independent phase-randomized weak coherent sources (PRWCS) using electrooptic intensity modulators driven with a field-programmable gate array. In this proof-of-principle experiment, we take advantage of the slight frequency mismatch of the two lasers to simulate the effect of phase randomization. In real QKD, the global phase of each transmitted state should be randomized When the quantum states arrive at Bob's receiver, he chooses to measure the time-of-arrival of the photons for a time-basis measurement or performs a phase-state measurement. In the latter, he interferes the incoming wavepacket with a locally generated, indistinguishable phase-state qudit at a beamsplitter. This is a quantum-controlled technique because the measurement outcome is controlled by the ancilla qudit generated by Bob's local oscillator. A successful measurement of the phase basis state is determined from the pattern of clicks registered by the single-photon counting detectors. Due to the probabilistic nature of PRWCS, some of the quantum states may contain zero or more than one photons, which results in an imperfect HOM visibility of only 50%. To extract the events that arise from the interference of single-photon states, we use a generalized decoy-state technique. By generating and detecting quantum states with different mean photon numbers, we place bounds on the single-photon contribution, and thus extract the interference visibility due to the single-photon states [5] .
We first characterize the indistinguishability of the two sources by measuring the HOM interference visibility as the relative time-delay between the two sources are varied using an optical delay line (ODL). By ensuring that the two sources are indistinguishable in spatial, temporal, polarization and spectral domain, we measure a HOM visibility of 0.50 ± 0.03, which is in very good agreement with the expected value of 0.50. By using decoy state technology, the HOM visibility of single photon states is expected to be zero. We then perform a proof-of-principle demonstration of the QKD scheme at a quantum channel loss of 3.2 dB, where we vary the dimension of the quantum states from d = 2 to d = 32. The time and phase bases states are prepared at a rate of 2.5/d GHz (time-bin width of 400 ps) with probabilities 0.90, and 0.10, respectively. The width of the wavepackets are set to be 100 ps (full-width at halfmaximum). The second intensity modulator in both Alice and Bob's stations are used to create states with three different mean photon numbers ∼ 0.5, 0.11 and 0.007 per state, each generated with a probability of 1/3. Figure 1(c) shows the experimentally extracted secret key rate (orange squares) as a function of dimension. At a channel loss of 3.2 dB, where the quantum states arrive at the receiver faster than the superconducting nanowire single-photon detectors (>70% efficiency) can reset (∼ 50 ns), we observe that the secret key rate maximizes at d = 8 and a secret key rate of 18.1 Mbps is achieved. The corresponding error rate in the time-(phase-) basis increases a function of dimension, but remains below 2.5% (7.5%) at d = 32. Going beyond d = 8, we observe that the secret key rate decreases with dimension. This is due to multiple reasons: First, increasing the dimension increases the frame size, and therefore the rate of detection decreases at the receiver. Second, the quantum bit error rate in the phase basis increases with dimension, which reduces the secret key rate. This is also consistent with our simulated secret key rate (solid black line) as shown in Fig. 1(c) . We acknowledge the financial support of the Office of Naval Research Multidisciplinary University Research Initiative program on Wavelength-Agile QKD in a Marine Environment (grant N00014-13-1-0627).
